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In a progressive jurisdiction a discovery rule in medical malpractice actions is inevitable simply because it should be. The only question is how
best to arrive at that point. To make any abrupt change in a century-old
statutory interpretation may present a hurdle more appropriately undertaken
by the legislature than the judiciary. California has recently undertaken this
step and enacted a specific statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions. 60 An analytical review of the experiential data available from California and other jurisdictions applying a general discovery rule should prove
informative for identifying and, therefore, anticipating any probable sources
of difficulty. Certainly the statutory and judicial experience gained from
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Insurance Law should not continue to
go unrecognized. It unquestionably has direct relevancy to say nothing of
the wealth of easily accessible data which it makes available. The interpretive results obtained from these empirical data rather than some isolated
court ruling or jurisdictional frequency distribution should provide the
source material for defining statutory boundaries. 6 '
Possibly a reexamination of statutory purpose may suffice. A limitations
rule for a medical malpractice action which bears no relation to the discovery
of when a cause of action even exists, serves no purpose other than an arbitrarily defined statute of repose.
Glory Sturiale

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-HATCH ACT-DoEs PROHIBITING GOVERN-

MENT EMPLOYEES FROM TAKING ANY ACTIVE PART IN POLITICAL MAN-

AGEMENT OR IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS CONTRAVENE FIRST AMENDMENT
GUARANTEES? 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2) (1970).
Since the inception of the Civil Service Act in 1883, several Presidents
have issued executive orders' limiting the activities of federal employees.
60. The legislative history of this act, its effect on existing law, and the everlurking insurance consequences are discussed in Comment, A Four Year Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plaintiff's Case Be Barred?, 2 PAc. L.J.

663 (1971); CAL. CIV. PROC. ANN. § 340.5 (Deering 1972).
61. The New York Court of Appeals expressed a similar view: "We are more
convinced, however, by the basic logic of the discovery rule than the numbers of jurisdictions which support that view. It is not only an equitable rule but also entirely
consistent with the underlying purpose of the Statute of Limitations." Flanagan v.
Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 28 (1969).
1. The two most noteworthy are those of Presidents Cleveland and Roosevelt.
President Cleveland issued the first executive order to the Commission. Memorandum
to Department Heads, July 14, 1886, in RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 494 (1898); President Roosevelt's order incorporated the
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Using the presidential rules as guidelines, the Civil Service Commission adjudicated cases until 1938, when the issue of federal employee participation
in political activities reached a climax. In that year a senate committee, the
Sheppard committee, was formed to investigate reported incidents of the use
of federal funds for political purposes.

The results of this study confirmed

the allegations. 2 Immediately thereafter, Senator Carl Hatch introduced
a bill to regulate such activity. 3 The bill was designed to perfect free elections by insuring that government employees would not be coerced at the
ballot box by their superiors. The bill, though strongly attacked, was passed
4
by Congress.
present language into the rules of the Civil Service Commission.

"Persons who by

the provisions of these rules are in the competitive classified service .. .shall take no
active part in political management or in political campaigns." Exec. Order No. 642
(1907), quoted in Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.. 986, 988

(1951).

2. The committee found gross political irregularities in connection with the
operation of Works Progress Administration, notably in Kentucky, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania. S. REP. No. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 CONG. REC. 3137 (1939).
3. S. 1871, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 CONG. REC. 2935 (1939).
4. The statutory title to the Act is An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political
Activity. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147. The controversial section
reads: "No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or
any agency or department thereof, shall take any active part in political management
or in political campaigns ......
Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1147,
1148. This section of the bill received much discussion. 84 CONG. REC. 9622 (1939)
(remarks of Senator Hobbs):
Every single solitary pernicious activity is interdicted by the terms of this bill.
Every abuse of power, bribery, coercion, threats, intimidation, solicitation of funds
from relief workers, or from anybody on relief, every exercise of official authority
or influence, all of those things you cry out against are interdicted by this bill already. But when you come to this section of the bill [9] you say that no matter
how honestly a Federal officeholder in his supervisory or administrative capacity
may conduct himself . . . he cannot participate in political management or political campaigns. . . . If you do this thing, you not only violate the Constitution,
you not only violate every natural right of every citizen in the United States, but
by doing this you divest him of citizenship and you have set up the process of
disintegration, whereby the Government "of the people, by the people, and for
the people" will have begun to perish from the earth.
Id. at 9630 (remarks of Senator Hook): "You cannot make this bill constitutional
while you are depriving people of their rights." Id. at 9634 (remarks of Senator
Sabath): "Here you have a bill absolutely contrary to the spirit of the Bill of Rights
and the fundamental liberties guaranteed under our Constitution."
The bill had many proponents. 84 CONG. REC. 9629 (1939) (remarks of Senator
Healey):
[T]he first section makes it unlawful for any person to intimidate, threaten, or
coerce any person in the manner they vote. We also have another section which
prohibits the use of a person's political position to influence votes. Certainly, the
objective, insofar as making persons in W.P.A. untouchable has been accomplished,

and I think that this is the heart of this bill. ...

[T]he principal purpose of this bill was to cure abuses and ills that were found
to exist in the administration of W.P.A .....
Id. at 9633 (remarks of Senator Michener): 'This nonpartisan investigating committee
[Sheppard committee] recommended the Hatch Bill as a specific against political corruption as practiced in the 1938 election."
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While the Act restricted the political activity of government employees, it
did not attempt to define which activities were prohibited. Instead, it
adopted those activities the Commission had prohibited in its decisions prior
to the passage of the Act.r The basic purpose of the Act was evident; to
make it ".

.

. unlawful for any person employed in any administrative posi-

tion by the United States or by any department, independent agency, or
other agency of the United States . . . to use his official authority for the
purpose of interfering with, or affecting the election or nomination of any
candidate.
...
6 However, the specific prohibitions were not clear.
The 1939 Act applied only to federal government employees. Since
grants of monies to state agencies were distributed by state officials, the
need was apparent to regulate political activity among state government
employees as well. In 1940, Senator Hatch introduced a second bill to extend to certain state employees the provisions of the original Act.7 The proposal was attacked, largely because it failed to define any proscribed activities which came under the heading "any active part in political management
or in political campaigns."
In the election year atmosphere, the need to
5. Some of these prohibited activities were compiled in Civil Service Commission
Form 1236 (Sept. 1939). These restrictions may presently be found in CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION PAMPHLET 20 (1966).
For a complete compilation of these decisions see
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

POLITICAL

ACTIVrTY

REPORTER

(1971).

Questions con-

cerning Hatch Act restrictions may be presented in writing to the Office of the General Counsel, United States Civil Service Commission, 1900 E. Street, N.W. Washington,
D.C. 20415.
6. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 2, 53 Stat. 1147, 1148.
7. S.3046, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 86 CoNG. REC. 62 (1940).
8. The bill included the wording of the original Act. "No such officer or employee shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns.
S."
. 3046, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., § 12(a) (1940). Likewise, the bill made no
attempt to clarify the confusion as to which activities were prohibited. The bill
merely stated that
[tihe provisions of this Act which prohibit persons to whom such provisions apply
from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns
shall be deemed to prohibit the same activities on the part of such persons as the
United States Civil Service Commission has heretofore determined are at the time
this section takes effect prohibiting on the part of employees in the classified
civil service of the United States by the provisions of the civil-service rules prohibiting such employees from taking any active part in political management or in
political campaigns.
S.3046, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 12(a) (1940). Since the bill did not attempt to define
any prescribed activities, it was attacked from the floor. 86 CoNG. REC. 2940 (1940)
(remarks of Senator Minton): "It will not do much good to put into the RECORD
the rules and regulations we are writing into the statute, if we do not know what
they are. No one on the floors of the Senate, not even the Senator from New Mexico
[Senator Hatch], now knows what these rules and regulations are." Id. at 2958
(remarks of Senator Brown): "No citizen of my State should be bound by a Federal
Statute which merely says he may not engage in political activity. He has a right to
know what political activity is to be condemned . .

.

. Strangely, one of the bills

most ardent supporters was Senator Alben Barkley, who had been an outspoken opponent of the original bill. The Senator argued that
Congress has never attempted in any of its civil-service laws to define what is
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curb political irregularities at the state level was recognized, and the bill was
passed. 9 But the cloud of doubt which existed after passage of the 1939
Act continues to linger as the source and focal point of litigation setting
public policy against constitutional rights.' 0
Eight years after the passage of the Act, the United States Supreme
Court in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell," upheld Congress'
right to impose restrictions on federal employee rights, 12 but made no attempt

to clarify the meaning of "pernicious political activity. '' 13 A companion
case 14 held that the provision in the Act including state employees was likewise constitutional, but again the Court made no attempt to discern proscribed activities. Rather, it contented itself, as before, with restating Conpernicious political activity, for the situations are so variable, the facts are so different. Rarely, if ever, are the facts in two cases precisely alike. So I do not know
how far Congress could go, or how wise it would be for Congress to define what
is pernicious political activity. . .
This is such a flexible term, depending on
the facts of each case, that I believe Congress by undertaking to include certain
things, might not include many other things which ought to be included, simply
because of the inability to think of all of them at once.
86 CONG. REC. 2952 (1940) (remarks of Senator Barkley).
9. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. Senator George expressed the
concern shared by many regarding the need for passage of the bill:
Within the past 7 and a fraction years . . . there has been the most rapid concentration of power in the Federal Government that has taken place at any given
period of time in our whole history. In order to relieve many of the conditions we
found in 1933 to be intolerable . . .we found it necessary to appropriate the
largest sums of money that have ever been appropriated by our government in
peacetime.
[IT]o make effective the provisions adopted for the safeguarding of the enormous
sums of money which we are appropriating to the several States and for the use
of the general Government, we must say that certain political activities must
cease within these organizations . .

.

. [T]he purpose of the proposed legislation

• . .is to preserve freedom of elections. . . . [Ellections must remain free, that
they must not be controlled by the Federal Government, or by State officials who
are administering Federal funds.
86 CONG. REc. 2954-55 (1940).
10. Section 15 of the Act of 1940 merely incorporated activities proscribed by
the Commission in the cases it adjudicated between 1883 and 1940. Since these
proscribed activities were not codified, employees could not determine which activities
were prohibited. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 15, 54 Stat. 767. For a compilation
of these cases, see CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, POLITICAL ACTIVITY REPORTER (1971).
11. 330 U.S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947).
12. "The teaching of experience has evidently led Congress to enact the Hatch Act
provisions. To declare that the present supposed evils of political activity are beyond
the power of Congress to redress would leave the nation impotent to deal with what
many sincere men believe is a material threat to the democratic system." Id. at 99,
67 S.Ct. at 569, 91 L. Ed. at 772.
13. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, stated: "We need to examine no further at this time into the validity of the definition of political activity .... ." Id.
at 103-4, 67 S.Ct. at 571, 91 L. Ed. at 775. However, Justice Black, dissenting, said:
"[W]hat federal employees can or cannot do, consistently with the various civil service
regulations, rules, warnings, etc., is a matter of so great uncertainty that no person
can even make an intelligent guess." Id. at 110, 67 S.Ct. at 574, 91 L. Ed. at 778.
14. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544,
91 L. Ed. 794 (1947).
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gress' right to legislate to keep political activity separate from public employment.'r The Court in Mitchell did state that classified employees
could participate in nonpartisan political activity, reasoning that the Act
"leaves untouched full participation by employees in political decisions at
the ballot box and forbids only the partisan activity of . . . personnel
deemed offensive to efficiency."' 6 Unfortunately, subsequent cases left un17
disturbed this "shotgun approach" taken by the Act.
15. "The end sought by Congress through the Hatch Act is better public service by requiring those who administer funds for national needs to abstain from active
political partisanship." Id. at 143, 67 S. Ct. at 553, 91 L. Ed. at 806.
16. United Public Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99, 67 S. Ct. 556, 569,
91 L. Ed. 754, 772 (1947).
17. Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574, 582 (D.R.I. 1972). Using the cases adjudicated by the Civil Service as the basis for prohibited activities, the courts found
filing for political office prohibited. Northern Va. Regional Park Authority v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 307 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Va. 1970), aii'd, 437 F.2d
1346 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n
v. Wisconsin Natural Resources Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Fishkin v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appeal
dism'd, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp.
568 (E.D. Wis. 1968); In re Ramshaw, 266 F. Supp. 73 (D. Idaho 1967); In re
Higginbotham, 221 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. Pa. 1963), afj'd, 340 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965); Johnson v. State Civil Serv. Dep't, 157 N.W.2d
747 (Minn. 1966); Ivancie v. Thornton, 443 P.2d 612 (Ore. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1018 (1969). Membership on a political committee is also prohibited. Palmer v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849
(1962); Osheim v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 299 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Wis.
1969); Democratic State Cent. Comm. v. Andolsek, 249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1966);
Engelhardt v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 197 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ala. 1961),
afI'd, 304 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam). But see Brooks v. Nacrelli, 331
F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Gray v. City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D.
Ohio 1971); Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967). Soliciting votes for
any partisan political candidate is also prohibited. Jarvis v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 382 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1967); Utah v. United States, 286 F.2d 30
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961); Wages v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 170 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1948); Gray v. Macy, 239 F. Supp. 658 (D. Ore.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 358 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1966); City of Miami v.
Sterbenz, 203 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1967); State v. Stuler, 122 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1960). Circulating a petition has been. proscribed. In re Walker, 168 N.E.2d 535 (Ohio
1960). Contra, Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 126 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1955).
It is interesting to note that the court has held writing a letter to the editorial department of a newspaper for possible publication is not a proscribed activity. In Wilson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 136 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1955), a government employee wrote a letter criticizing Governor Shivers of Texas and sent it to the
Houston Post. The letter stated "I respect Republicans as such. I respect Democrats as such . .

.

. No one respects a renegade.

Let's send Allen Shivers home."

Upon its publication, his employment was terminated. Ordering him reinstated, the
court said that where "there is an isolated, unsolicited, unpaid for, expression of opinion which might never have been published, and nothing more appears, a premeditated
effort to engage in, or active participation in, a political campaign is not established.
• ..An isolated letter which might appear as a contribution to an organized campaign cannot fairly be considered active participation in a political campaign." Id.
at 106. Persons whose principal employment is not with the classified service are
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The first state case to deviate from the Supreme Court was Fort v. Civil
Service Commission.'8 Fort was a county employee who was also chairman
of the county committee to reelect Governor Brown. This position brought
him into conflict with prohibitions in section 41 of the county charter. 19
The court recognized that "[n]o one can reasonably deny the need to limit
some political activities such as the use of official influence to coerce political
action, the solicitation of political contributions from fellow employees, and
the pursuit of political purposes during those hours that the employee should
be discharging the duties of his position."' 20 The court went on to hold the
provision unconstitutional because it was "not narrowly drawn but [was]
framed in sweeping and uncertain terms that except only the right to vote
and to express opinions 'privately.' ",21 In an attempt to establish some criteria by which to adjudicate acts similar to the Hatch Act, the court remarked, "It must appear that restrictions imposed by a governmental entity
are not broader than are required to preserve the efficiency and integrity
' 22
of its public service."
exempted from the Act. Matturri v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 229 F.2d 435
(3d Cir. 1956); Anderson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 119 F. Supp. 567
(D. Mont. 1954).
18. 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
19. The pertinent section of the charter reads: "No person holding a position in
the classified civil service shall take any part in political management or affairs in any
political campaign or election, or in any campaign to adopt or reject any initiative or
referendum measure other than to cast his vote or to privately express his opinion."
Alameda County Charter § 41 (1962), quoted in Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 625, 626 (1964).
20. Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629 (1964).
21. Id. at 629. The basis of the court's decision to hold the provision unconstitutional was its overbreadth. " '[O]verbreadth' is a term used to describe a situation
where a statute proscribes not only what may constitutionally be proscribed, but also
forbids conduct which is protected, e.g., by the First Amendment's safeguards of freedom of speech and press." Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F. Supp. 842, 851 (E.D.
N.Y. 1969). The court based its holding on prior Supreme Court rulings on overbreadth, most notably NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d
405 (1963). The Court in Button held unconstitutional a Virginia statute making it
a criminal offense for attorneys to solicit business because the statute did not define
"soliciting." The Court reasoned that "[blecause First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity." Id. at 433, 83 S.Ct. at 338, 9 L. Ed. at 418. The court in Fort also
cited Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960). The
Court in Shelton stated that in the area of First Amendment freedoms that even if
the goals sought are legitimate, they "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose." Id. at 488, 81 S.Ct. at 252, 5 L. Ed. 2d at 237;
accord, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629
(1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S.Ct. 1238, 16 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1966);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1961). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970).
22. Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629 (1964); accord, Bagley v.
Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966); Kinnear v. City &
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Perhaps no single state case more clearly illustrates the constitutional
question involved than Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District.2a
The California Supreme Court in reversing a hospital employee's dismissal
for participating in political activity, set forth guidelines under which government agencies could require a waiver of constitutional rights as a condition of public employment. The court said that the agency must demonstrate "(1) that the political restraints rationally relate to the enhancement
of the public service, (2) that the benefits which the public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights, and (3)
that no alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights are available. '' 24
The first indication of a change in attitude by federal courts came in
Wisconsin State Employees Association v. Wisconsin Natural Resources
Board.25 There the court recognized the significance of the state decisions,
but stated that "[i]n any event, this court has the duty to follow a governing
decision of the Supreme Court unless that decision has been clearly eroded
by subsequent decisions which dictate a contrary result."' 26
Recently, the federal district court of the District of Columbia decided
National Association of Letter Carriersv. United States Civil Service Commission.27 That court held the Hatch Act provision, prohibiting government employees from taking any active part in political management or in
political campaigns, unconstitutional. 2z
The court stated: "The defect lies
County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1964); DeStephano v. Wilson, 233
A.2d 682 (N.J. Super. 1967); Minielly v. State, 411 P.2d 69 (Ore. 1966). See generally, Shartsis, The Federal Hatch Act and Related State Court Trends-A Time for
Change?, 25 Bus. LAw. 1381 (1970).
23. 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966). The plaintiff confined her activities on behalf of
a recall campaign to her off-duty hours, and in seeking to influence interested citizens
to vote for the recall, she did not advise them of her public employment. When she
notified her employer of her intent to continue in the recall movement, her employment was terminated.
24. Id. at 403.
25. 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969). The plaintiff, Kaukl, was employed by
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, and he filed as a candidate for
sheriff. His employment was terminated pursuant to WIs. STAT. ANN. § 16.30 (1965),
and the Hatch Act.
26. Id. at 350.
27. 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S.
Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 72-634). The National Association of Letter Carriers and
six federal employees brought a class action suit on behalf of all federal employees
seeking a declaratory judgment that 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970) (the provision of
the Hatch Act which prohibits federal employees from taking any active part in
political management or in political campaigns) is unconstitutional.
28. "An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by the government of the District of Columbia may not- . . . (2) take an active part in
political management or in political campaigns." 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970). The
court ruled the provision unconstitutional because of its overbreadth, arguing that "[i]f
the Congress undertakes to circumscribe speech, it cannot pass an act which, like this
one, talks in riddles, prohibiting in one breath what it may be argued to have allowed
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not in the basic underlying purpose to limit certain partisan political activties by federal employees but rather in its drafting. Prohibitions are worded
in generalities that lack precision. ' 29 The court recognized the significance
of Mitchell, but stated that "even if Mitchell's holding is considered binding
. . . it is inconsistent with subsequent decisions delineating First Amend-

ment freedoms.

30 °

The final disposition of the case has not been rendered. 3 ' Until it is, over
2,700,000 federal employees wait in political limbo,32 uncertain of their future role in the country's political process. This represents a threefold increase since the inception of the original Act. This increase has been paralleled by an increase in political awareness by the general public. Sadly, the
Hatch Act has not been kept abreast of changing conditions. Possibly taking
note of Justice Reed's statement in Mitchell concerning the expansion in the
ranks of government personnel,33 the court in National Association of Letter
Carriers stated that "[t]he decisions, coupled with changes in the size and

complexity of public service, place Mitchell among other decisions outmoded
by passage of time."'3 4 In view of the large number of personnel employed
by state and federal government agencies, certain restrictions are necessary.
Rather than the broad guidelines now in force, however, restrictions to regulate political activities should "carry some well defined limitations upon participation in partisan political matters . . . . -35 This would enable the employee to more fully participate in political activity, and at the same time
protect the smooth functioning of government agencies.
The necessity for providing a framework within which employees may
operate without fearing disciplinary repercussions is apparent. Although
in another, leaving the citizen unguided but at hazard for his job." National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp. 578, 585 (D.D.C.
1972).
29. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346
F. Supp. 578, 582 (D.D.C. 1972).
30. Id. at 585. Of subsequent decisions relied upon, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967), is prominent. See
Comment, The Hatch Act-A Constitutional Restraint of Freedom?, 33 ALBANY L.
REV. 345 (1969).
31. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346
F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 12,
1972) (No. 72-634).
32. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, Federal Civilian Manpower Statistics
(Nov. 1972).
33. "We do not know whether the number of federal employees will expand or
contract; whether the need for regulation of their political activities will increase or
diminish. The use of the constitutional power of regulation is for Congress, not for
the courts." United Public Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102, 67 S.Ct.
556, 571, 91 L. Ed. 754, 774 (1947).
34. 346 F. Supp. 578, 585 (D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 583.
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the Hatch Act is presently codified, 36 and section 7324(a)(2) of the Act

is incorporated into the rules of the Civil Service Commission,"7 uncertainty
is still present. Also, the rules promulgated by the Commission interpreting

the meaning and extent of the court decisions are found in the statutes. 38
While this may seem a more definitive guideline, a close reading of these
code provisions reveals that they do little more to delineate proscribed and

permitted activities than does the Act itself. Viewed as a whole, the codifications do not alleviate the problem, especially since the permitted activi3
ties are merely ones the courts have recognized.

9

Since the scope of permitted activities is vague, it is easily understood why
government employees fear any political activity. Many are career employees who have attained job security. To have their employment terminated for political activity would be a serious setback. Likewise, younger
employees interested in advancement or a career could find their employment suddenly severed.

Guarantees protecting the worker against unwar-

ranted termination are found in the codes. 40 Although the Commission does
36. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1970). The Act as applied to state employees is in 5
U.S.C. § 1501-08 (1970).
37.
No person employed in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or
any agency or department thereof, shall use his official authority or influence for
the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. No
person occupying a position in the competitive service shall take any active part in
political management or in political campaigns, except as may be provided by or
pursuant to statute. All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may
choose and to express their opinion on all political subjects and candidates.
5 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1972).
38. 5 -C.F.R. H§ 733.101-.402 (1972) (federal employees); 5 C.F.R. § 151.101.138 (1972) (state employees).
39. "All employees are free to engage in political activity to the widest extent
consistent with the restrictions imposed by law and this subpart." 5 C.F.R. § 733.111
(a) (1972) (emphasis added). Since the law is the Act, the restrictions "imposed"
by law are comprised of cases adjudicated interpreting the Act. Thirteen activities
are listed as permissible under this section: (1) Register and vote; (2) express an
opinion as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates;
(3) display a bumper sticker, political picture, badge, sticker or button; (4) participate
in the activities of a civic, professional or other organization; (5) be a member of a
political party and participate to the extent consistent with law; (6) attend a political
convention or fund raising dinner; (7) sign a political petition as an individual; (8)
make a political contribution; (9) take an active part in the election of an independent,
or run for office as an independent; (10) take an active part in the election of a
partisan candidate to the extent of the exception in 5 C.F.R. § 733.124 (1972); (11) be
politically active in connection with a question which is not specifically identified
with a political question; (12) serve as an election judge or clerk or in similar position to perform nonpartisan duties; and (13) otherwise participate fully in public affairs,
except as prohibited by law, in a manner which does not compromise his efficiency
or integrity as an employee or the neutrality, efficiency, or integrity of his agency.
Id. § 733.111(a).
40. "An agency may not take an adverse action against an employee covered
by this part except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."
id. § 752.104. Such cause as will warrant dismissal includes the following: delinquency or misconduct; criminal, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct; inten-
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provide an investigation when employment is terminated, 4 1 the language of
42
the statute is so broad that indiscriminate firing is still possible.
There are three principal reasons why the Act is unsuitable. It was intended to maintain free elections by insuring employees a job free from coercion at the ballot box. Because supervisory coercion is no longer prevalent, 43 this oft-stated purpose no longer presents a cogent argument for the
Act's retention. Instead, it has become a millstone for employees, prohibiting them from pursuing their constitutional right to participate in the political
process. The overbreadth of the Act has also unconstitutionally restricted
the exercise of free speech. Restrictions concerning political activity are
necessary, but the Act's "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect," 44 for they not only cure the ills intended, but have a
tional false statement in examination or appointment; refusal to furnish testimony as
required; habitual use of intoxicating beverages to excess; reasonable doubt as to
loyalty; any legal or other disqualification which makes the individual unfit for the
service. Id. § 731.201. The last clause is the catchall clause, which will enable the
service to terminate an employment should the employee's conduct be detrimental to
the service.
41. After a review of the report listing the charges against the employee, the
charges will be served on him at least 30 days before the date of the proposed adverse
action. The employee may answer the charges within 15 days, and after the review
of the answer the case will be remanded to the Commission for decision. If warranted by the facts, a motion for a continuance will be granted, at which time a
hearing is set. Upon termination of the hearing, the Commission's decision will be
given. If the Commission concluded that the employee engaged in prohibited political
activity, the penalty is removal from the service, unless the Commission unanimously
agrees that a less severe penalty is justified. Suspension without pay for 30 days is
the minimum penalty. 5 C.F.R. §§ 733.131-.137 (1972); see 5 C.F.R. §§ 5.2-5.4
(1972).
42.
In essence, notwithstanding the present qualifying language provision, the
present language is somewhat broad . . .
It is broad in the sense that it could be
construed to prohibit certain activities that may not be sufficiently detrimental
to the neutrality, efficiency, or integrity of the civil service as to justify the infringement of individual political rights.
COMMISSION ON POLITICAL AcTIvrrY OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL, HEARINGS, vol. 3,
at 15 (1968) (Statement of John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service
Comm'n).
43.
The economic tribulation experienced by our country in the 1930's resulted in legislative approval of several national programs designed to assist
destitute citizens. Scandals related to some relief projects and internal party difficulties over patronage provided the background for Congressional action in 1939
and 1940 to prevent political abuse of citizens because of their dependence on
government-sponsored benefits.
In retrospect, the Hatch Act was a product of its time. Given the circumstances
leading to its enactment, the statute met a pressing need.
Conditions have changed substantially in the intervening 33 years. . . . [In
light of the attitude of the public on politics, the political rights of civil employees,
and the necessity for retaining effective, impartial service to all citizens, Congress
should approve fundamental changes in the Hatch Act.
Statement of the Government Employees Council to the Senate Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1972).
44. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S. Ct. 328, 340, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405,
415 (1963).
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chilling effect on the exercise of fundamental rights. This overkill has
served to reduce government employees to second class citizens. Finally,

the tremendous increase in the number of government employees, coupled
with changing attitudes concerning political awareness, have made the Act

outmoded. In an era of political awareness, an Act which so seriously curtails the political freedom of one-tenth of the voting populace is insupport5
able.4
Government agencies could effectively function if operated strictly on

merit. 46 This would insure the employee an atmosphere free from supervisory coercion. The employee would be free to pursue political activities
separate from his employment as long as it did not adversely affect his job
performance, or that of his co-worker. Should this occur, the employee
could then be informed of possible repercussions should the situation continue.
In the alternative, Congress should restructure the Act to provide a clear
framework within which both the government agency and the employee will
be able to function freely. It is impossible to include every type activity
detrimental to efficient agency operation into one specific law. A revision
to bring the Act into focus with the realities of today is, however, possible.
In the past year, three bills were introduced in Congress to accomplish
this.4 7 As yet, no positive legislation has been enacted. However, a restructuring of the Act will be necessary if the Supreme Court in National
Association of Letter Carriers declares it unconstitutional. Restructuring is
45. [T]he Hatch Act impinge[s] on the political and civil rights of about 10% of
the voting population. When it is realized that about 2,750,000 federal employees,
their spouses and children (presumably under the employees control), persons in
the military services, or employed in a state or local government where part of the
salary stems from the federal treasury or employed in poverty or other private organizations to which funds are allotted by the Federal Government are subject to
the Act, the insidious scope of the Hatch Act begins to become manifest. The
Hatch Act presents a clear and present danger to the democratic system of the republic.
Remarks of Harry Zucker, President of the Veterans Administration, A.F.L., also a
Government Legal Rating Specialist, Hearings Before the Committee on Post Office
and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 246 (1972).
46. "The term 'Merit System' has a well-defined and well-understood meaning.
It is defined . . . as: 'The system of appointing employees to office . . . and of promoting them for competency only; opposed, in U.S., to Spoils System.'" Heck v. Hall,
190 So. 280, 285 (Ala. 1939). See also Kipher v. City of Lima, 32 N.E.2d 488
(Ohio Ct. App. 1936).
"[T]he very purpose and effect of the merit system is to
take from the appointing officer the right of arbitrary removal, either directly or indirectly, of an appointee, which he would otherwise have." Donaldson v. Sisk, 113
P.2d 860, 865 (Ariz. 1941).
47. Hearings on H.R. 668 Before a Committee on House Administration, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on S. 3374 Before the Committee on Post Office
and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on S. 3417 Before the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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